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NOTES
THE BARTH CASE AND REVIVAL OF INCOME TAX CLAIMS BY
RETROACTIVE REPEAL OF LIMITATIONS
In September, 1919, the John Barth Company filed claims in
abatement for its 1918 income taxes, pursuant to §214 (a) and §234
(a), paragraph 14 (a),' of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 (here-
inafter called the bond provision), and executed a bond to pay "on
notice and demand by the collector . . . any part of such tax found
by the Commissioner to be due." On March 25, 1926, the Commis-
sioner rejected the claim in part, and upon refusal of the taxpayer and
surety to pay, authorized suit on the bond. The Circuit Court of
" U. S. Comp. St. §§6336%g(a), 63366pp(a), deductions for inventory
losses.
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Appeals,2 in June, 1928, dismissed the complaint upon the following
grounds: That collection of the tax was barred by §250 (d),s Acts of
1918 and 1921, providing a five year period of limitation. That the
liability of the surety on the bond was extinguished by §1106 (a), 4
Act of 1926 (hereinafter called the extinguishing provision) which
provided that the running of the statute of limitations should not only
bar the remedy but extinguish the tax liability. That the repeal of the
extinguishing provision "as of the date of its enactment" by the
Revenue Act of 19285 was ineffective to revive liability on the bond.
The Supreme Court6 in May 1929, held the limitation on collection
of the tax in §250 (d) inapplicable to the situation where a bond is
given under the bond provision of §234 (a), paragraph 14 (a), and
reversed the judgment.
Is this decision limited to the situation where a claim in abate-
ment is filed and a bond given under the section specifically providing
for a bond and claim in abatement, or does it apply to all cases where
claims are filed and bonds given? The Supreme Court opinion is
far from clear, but it appears that the statute of limitations in the
former situation would be suspended until the Commissioner has
passed upon the claim in abatement, in view of the limitation in the
bond provision that where a claim is filed and bond given there-
under, "payment of the tax covered by such claim shall not be re-
quired until the claim is decided."7 There may well be a distinction
between the liability upon a bond given under this provision and one
not given thereunder, in the sense that the provision impliedly ex-
tends the statute of limitations for the period during which collection
of the tax is prohibited.
If this interpretation of the decision is correct, the question re-
mains as to the result in the usual case where a bond is given to stay
collection of an assessment but not under the specific bond provision.
'United States v. John Barth Co. and U. S. F. and G. Co., 27 F. (2d)
682 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
'U. S. Comp. St. §63363/stt(d).
' 44 Stat. L. c. 27, p. 2, 9, 26 U. S. C. A. §1249.§612 Revenue Act of 1928, 45 St. L. 791, 875.
'United States v. John Barth Co., 279 U. S. 370, 48 Sup. Ct. 366 (1929).
'Supra note 1. The statement of the court that the bond is "a substitution
for the obligation arising under the return and assessment to pay the tax," giv-
ing the United States "a cause of action separate and distinct from an action to
collect taxes which it already had," (Snupra note 6, at 375) seems inconsistent
with an implied extension by the "bond provision" of the statute. It is con-
ceded that no limitation has run on the bond, but if the bond is a "substitute,"
the statute would have run on the tax liability.
NOTES
The Circuit Court of Appeals 8 in the Barth case, finding no exten-
sion of the limitation period by this provision, directly faced this
question. The five year limitation period8 would have run on col-
lection of the tax in the Barth case, unless waived, and the mere filing
of the claim and giving of the bond would not toll the statute.10
The claim of the government would then rest entirely on the bond, the
liability of the surety depending upon the construction of his obliga-
tion to pay "whatever tax is found to be due."
The limitation period having run on the tax, under the provision
of the 192611 Act that the running of the statute of limitations should
not only bar the remedy but also extinguish the liability, there would
be no "tax due" by the principal,' 2 and hence no obligation on the
'Supra note 2.
"Statute runs from time return is due or made for 1918, and from filing of
the return for 1921, supra note 3; but not from filing of tentative return, Oak
Worsted Mills v. United States, (Ct. Claims 1929) No. J-180, United States
Daily, Dec. 18, 1929, 1929 Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Service, 1918. Bars
not only court proceedings but also collection by distraint, Bowers v. New York
and Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U. S. 346, 47 Sup. Ct. 389 (1927).
Section 278(d), Act of 1924, provided that where the assessment is made
within the period prescribed, such tax may be collected by proceeding in court
within six years after assessment of the tax. But §278(e) of the same act
provided that this section shall not authorize the collection of the tax if at the
time of the enactment of the act such proceeding was barred by the period of
limitations then in existence. In Russell v. U. S., 278 U. S. 181, 49 Sup. Ct.
121 (1928), the Supreme Court held §278(d) not retroactive. Hence, if there
was no suspension of the statute in the Barth case, the 1924 provisions would
not extend time for collection of defendant's 1918 taxes. See Albus, The
Statute of Limitations as Affected by Recent Court Decisions, 5 NAT. INC.
TAX MAG. 166.
" C. B. Shaffer, 12 B. T. A. 298; Muller, Ex'r., 13 B. T. A. 1175. Statute
is waived only by consent in writing by the commissioner and taxpayer to
later determination and assessment of the tax, §250(d), Act of 1921, supra
note 3.
' Supra note 4.
"The Circuit Court of Appeals, supra note 2, at p. 784 distinguished be-
tween an obligation to pay a "sum of money which the Commissioner should
find due as a tax" and the obligation of defendant surety to pay a "tax due,"
justifying this distinction upon the ground that a surety's contract should be
construed strictly, and held the surety's obligation as fully met by extinguish-
ment of the tax as by payment by the taxpayer. Accord: Bardy v. U. S.,
24 F. (2d) 205 (D. C. Mass., 1927). See M. P. Spencer, 11 B. T. A. 437.
Contra: U. S. v. Onken Bros. Co., 23 F. (2d) 367 (D. C. D. Wyo. 1927); Gray
Motor Co. v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 5th 1927) ; U. S. v. Rennolds, 27
F. (2d) 902 (D. C. N. Y. 1928) ; cf. Bardy v. U. S., 24 F. (2d) 205 (D. C.
Mass. 1927) (outlawed tax is as if never laid) ; M. P. Spencer, 11 B. T. A.
437 (liability was extinguished by §1106(a) and not assessable against trans-feree).The 1926 extinguishing provision was construed as operating retroactively
to determine the effect of the statutory bar completed before the passage of
the act. If so, the discussion in the text and conclusions would be applicable
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bond. What, then, is the effect of the retroactive repeal of this pro.
vision by the Revenue Act of 192871? This question, escaped by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Barth case, stands on
the frontier of federal tax litigation. Many pending cases await its
final determination.
Three views have been taken of the validity (under various due
process and vested rights clauses of state and federal constitutions)
of statutes reviving causes of action barred by limitations. The lead-
ing case of Campbell v. Holt1 4 adopts the view15 which in general
terms affirms their validity. The ground taken is that the statute of
limitations acts only upon the remedy and not upon the right, and
that the prior existence and present non-payment of original obliga-
tions make the revival just in all cases not involving title to specific
property (as to which it is agreed that the bar of the statute creates
a vested right that cannot be thus impaired).
both where statutory bar was completed before 1926 and where it was com-
pleted after 1926 and before its repeal.
Departmental rulings are to the effect that waivers filed after the running of
the statutory period and after liabilities are extinguished under provision of
§1106(a), Act of 1926, are nullities and do not extend time for taxpayer claim-
ing refunds, (G. C. M. 5983, VIII-38-4363, Prentice-Hall Tax Service 1929,
1498, waiver before passage of 1928 Act) nor for assessment or collection of
tax by government (G. C. M. 5601, VIII-5-4088, Prentice-Hall. Tax Service
1929, 335): see Joy Floral Co v. Commissioner, 29 F. (2d) 865 (Ct. App.
D. C. 1928).
" The validity of the repeal of the extinguishing provision before the statute
of limitations has completely expired on collection of the tax is not questioned,
since the extinguishing provision deals only with completed bars. The power
to change the statute of limitations before the period has expired is conceded
by the courts, with the limitation that such change must allow a reasonable time
within which to exercise the right. See I Woou, LimiTATjoNis, (4th ed. 1916)
§11; Nomrs (1904) 95 A. S. R 658; (1907) 111 A. S. R. 456; (1899) 45 L. .
A. 611; (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1316, 1319.
115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209 (1884), Justices Bradley and Harlan dis-
senting; Capps Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 15 F. (2d) 528 (C. C. A. 5th 1926); Linter
v. Heye, 194 U. S. 628, 24 Sup. Ct. 856 (1903) ; F. M. Aiken, 10 B. T. A. 553
(1928), applying rule to income tax statutes.
"'Dunbar v. Boston etc. Corp., 181 Mass. 383, 63 N. E. 913 (1926); Jack-
son Hill Coal Co. v. Comm'rs., 181 Ind. 340, 104 N. E. 498 (1914); House
v. Carr, 185 N. Y. 458, 78 N. E. 172 (1906), power of sale under barred mort-
gage upheld; Johnson v. Eynne, 64 Kan. 138, 67 Pac. 549 (1901), bar not basis
for bill quia timet on personal claim; see WooD, op. cit. supra note 13, §§11,
63a, 68.
Early North Carolina cases deny the power of the legislature to revive a
barred claim: Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C. 542, 545 (1884). Later opinions,
however, seem to approve the rule of Campbell v. Holt, smpra note 14, although
the decisions have not been direct upon the point: Dunn v. Beaman. 126 N. C.
766. 770. 36 S. E. 172, 173 (1900) ; Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 602, 73 S. E.
992 (1912) ; Williams v. Motor Express Lines, 195 N. C. 682, 143 S. E. 256
(1927); cf. Vanderbilt v. A. C. L. Ry., 188 N. C. 568, 125 S. E. 387 (1924).
NOTES
The second view,16 broadly denying the proposition, is that the
right to remain free from future actions on obligations once barred
is an interest as desirable to protect as an interest in specific property,
actions for the recovery of which have been barred. The bar of the
statute is therefore effective to extinguish the liability itself, a view
most consistent with the purpose of a statute of repose. 17 Property
is no longer an exclusively physical concept and logical consistency
demands the same result whenever the defendant has gained immun-
ity from suit whether plaintiff's claim sounds in tort, contract, re-
plevin or ejectment.
The third view, while denying any general validity to legislative
attempts to revive barred actions for debts or torts, sustains them
where the defenses are based on formalities and technical mistakes,
and where "the circumstances . ..appeal with some strength to the
prevailing view of justice."' 8
In other words, the three views come down to this: where the
court construes the running of the limitation period as barring the
remedy only, it upholds legislative extensions; but where the statute
is viewed as barring the liability itself, legislative extensions are held
void. The reversal of the rule of Campbell v. Holt19 by the ex-
tinguishing provision of the Revenue Act of 1926 would, therefore,
constitute the statutory bar a vested "immunity" in the taxpayer. The
due process provision of the fifth amendment does not, however,
so limit the taxing power of Congress as to prevent the taking away
of vested rights by a valid exercise of such power.20 As to the tax-
payer, the repeal of the extinguishing provision may therefore be
upheld as a mode of imposing a new tax obligation.2 1  But the
"0 Board of Education v. Blodgett, 155 Ill. 448, 46 A. S. R. 353, 31 L. R. A.
73, 40 N. E. 1027 (1895) ; Fish v. Farwell, 160 Ill. 236, 43 N. E. 367 (1896) ;
Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 103 Wis. 380, 79 N. W. 435 (1899) ; Ryder v.
Wilson's Ex'rs., 41 N. J. L. 9 (1879). For general discussion, see notes cited
supra note 13.
"Wood, op. cit. supra note 13, §49.
'Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 473, 477, 59 N. E. 1033, 1035
(1901), by Holmes, C. J.
"Supra note 6.
H O mES, F~anaAL TAXATION (6 ed. 1927) §952.
= "No vested right accrues to the taxpayer out of the running of the period
of limitation" (meaning merely that whatever rights accrue through the bar of
the statute may be taken away by valid exercise of taxing power) : Huntley v.
Gile, 32 F. (2d) 857, 859 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), citing Rafferty v. Smith, Bell
and Co., 257 U. S. 226, 42 S. Ct. 71 (1921) ; U. S. v. Heinszen and Co., 206
U. S. 370, 386, 27 Sup. Ct. 742 (1906), act ratifying illegal collection of tax
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surety's liability is derivative, and his contract does not extend to a
new tax on the taxpayer principal. As to the surety, the repealing
provision cannot be reasonably construed as an exercise of the tax-
ing power.22 Hence, the repeal of the extinguishing provision should
be ineffective to revive liability on the bond.
This was the result of the decision upon rehearing of the Barth
case in the Circuit Court of Appeals, which the Supreme Court found
unnecessary to consider. The Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
stated no reasons for its conclusion. It is submitted that for the
reasons given in the foregoing discussion the Supreme Court should,
when the point is squarely raised, adopt a similar view.
J. H. ANDERSON, JR.
DELAY IN PRESENTMENT OF DoMIcILED NOTE
In a recent case1 the plaintiff, as indorsee, held a note of the
defendant maker payable at the maker's bank at a specified date.
Between the dates of the maturity of the note and demand on the
maker the bank failed and the maker lost deposits sufficient to pay
the note. In a suit on the note a verdict was directed for plaintiff,
without interest and costs. On appeal it was urged that, under section
87 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, plaintiff should bear the loss
caused by his failure to present. It was held, two justices dissenting,
that no presentment is necessary to charge the party primarily liable,
and the judgment should be affirmed.
The majority of courts attempting to determine the question of
the instant case have adopted the theory that the bank at which a
domiciled note (i.e., one payable at a bank) is made payable, is the
agent of the parties.2  The rights of the maker can not be justly de-
valid because of power of Congress to have authorized imposition of taxes in
mode in which they were enforced.
Exercise of the taxing power is constitutional unless it is so arbitrary as to
amount to a confiscation of property, or is so wanting in basis for classification
as to produce a gross and patent inequality. There is no precise application
of the rule of reasonableness of classification to taxing power of Congress.
The rule of equality only requires that the law shall operate on all alike under
the same circumstances. HoLMEs, op. cit. supra note 20. For- discussion of
constitutionality of retroactive taxing statutes, see NoTw (1928) 28 Coi. L.
Rxv. 777.
Moreover, imposition of a new obligation on the surety measured by the
old liability on the bond is entirely different from re-imposition of a once valid
tax on the taxpayer principal. The revival of the surety's obligation would
not be in the class of excise or privilege taxes, but would resemble a direct
tax on sureties in similar situations measured by definite sums previously due
under past closed contracts, and as such would be void without apportionment.I Federal International Credit Bank v. Epstin, 148 S. E. 713 (S. C. 1929).
'Note 2 A. L. R. at 1782.
NOTES
termined on this theory as the bank is, in fact, debtor to its depositors,
not their agent. And the bank becomes the agent of the holder only
if he presents it at the bank for collection. At common law, and
under the Negotiable Instruments Law, courts adopting the agency
theory have unanimously held that if the holder neglects to present
he loses nothing but interest and costs,3 but if he is diligent and does
present to the bank designated as the place of payment the loss due
to bank failure falls on him because his agent, the ,bank, was negligent
in not remitting while funds were available.4
Another theory advanced by many courts is that a note payable
at a bank is analogous to a check. The limits to which the analogy
should be carried were not clearly defined in section 87 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law.5 As there is no distinction to be drawn be-
tween cases decided on this theory before and after passage of this
law no special discussion of the common law is necessary. Section 87
provides that a note payable at a bank where the maker has sufficient
funds is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the
account of the principal debtor thereon. The courts and bankers
interpret this, generally, to mean that the bank has permission to pay
the note as it would a check.6 The analogy would probably be ex-
'Wood v. Merchant's Saving Co., 41 Ill. 267 (1866); Adams v. Hacken-
sack Improvement Commission, 15 Vroom 638, 44 N. J. L. 638, 43 Am. Rep.
406 (1882) ; Williamsport Gas Co. v. Pinkerton, 95 Pa. 62 (1880) ; Binghamp-
ton Pharmacy v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S. W. 1038, 2 A. L. R.
1377 and Note (1915) ; Sebag v. Abrithol, 4 M. & S. 462, 105 Eng. Reprints
905 (1816).
' Kansas City Bank v. Dick, 84 Kan. 252, 114 Pac. 378 (1911) ; Peaslee-Gul-
bert Co. v. Dixon, 172 N. C. 411, 90 S. E. 421 (1916) ; Smith v. Essex Co. Bank,
22 Barb. 627 (N. Y. 1856) ; Baldwin's Bank of Penn. Yan v. Smith, 215 N. Y.
76, 109 N. E. 138 (1915). Cases adopting the agency theory are based almost
wholly on the English case of Sebag v. Abrithol and Wood v. Merchant's Sav-
ing Co., supra note 3, neither of which are authority for that theory. While
agency has nothing to do with determining the rights of the holder against the
maker, it may be useful in determining the rights between the 'holder and the
bank if the bank neglects to collect out of available funds, the bank being liable
as agent to its principal, the holder: 2 Paton's Digest §§372a, 1502a.
'(1928) 22 ILL. L. Rrv. 833, 846, that the meaning of §87 is not clear.
'Bedford Bank v. Acoam, 125 Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713, 9 L. R. A. 560, 21
Am. St. Rep. 258 (1890) ; Heinrich v. First Nat. Bank of Middleton, 219 N. Y.
1, 113 N. E. 531, L. R. A. 1917A 655 (1916) ; West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Amer-
ican Surety Co. of N. Y., 5 S. W. (2d) 669 (1928) ; see Aetna Nat. Bank v.
Fourth Nat. Bank of N. Y., 46 N. Y. 82, 88, 7 Am. Rep. 314, 318 (1871), "An
acceptance or promissory note thus payable (at a bank) is, if the party is in
funds, that is, has the amount to -his credit, equivalent to a check, and is, in
effect, an order, or draft on the bank in favor of the holder, for the amount of
the note or acceptance." I DANIELS, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (6 ed. 1913)§326a; 2 MoRSE, BANKS AND BANKING (6 ed. 1928) §557; 2 PATON'S DIGEST
(1926) §§3719a, 3721a, 3744a. Cmotra: Wood v. Merchant's Saving Co., 41
Ill. 267 (1866) ; Grissom v. Bank, 87 Tenn. 350, 10 S. W. 744, 10 Am. St. Rep.
669, 3 L. R. A. 273, (1889).
Answers to letters sent to several banks in North Carolina asking them if
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tended to include losses occurring after maturity as in the case of
failure to present a check in a reasonable time, were it not for the fact
that section 70 provides that no presentment is necessary to charge a
party primarily liable,7 a provision which many courts interpret as
contradictory to the suggested analogy.8 There is no necessary con-
tradiction, however. 9 Damages caused to the maker by the holder's
failure to present a domiciled note at maturity may be awarded with-
out denying the liability of the maker as the party primarily liable.
In some cases the maker's counterclaim for damages would amount
to practically as much as his liability on the note, but that fact does
not operate to relieve him of a primary obligation.
they paid domiciled notes without express authority, indicate that the bank's
interpretation of §87 is that it gives authority to pay the note as if it were a
check. Eight out of thirteen banks questioned said they had authority to do so,
while three concluded that they had no such authority. Two did not commit
themselves. But twelve banks stated that, for the convenience of their depos-
itors, they did not pay the notes without communicating with the maker, while
one bank paid as if the note were a check. Like inquiries in communities out-
side the state received similar answers. See (1928) 13 MINN. L. REy. 281,284.
The question of the bank's liability to the maker of a domiciled note for re-
fusal to pay if the maker can not be communicated with is pertinent. Refusal
to pay a check when the drawer has funds sufficient to cover it subjects the
bank to a suit in tort: (1928) 6 N. C. L. Rev. 324. At common law there
were three views concerning the authority and duty of the bank to pay a domi-
ciled note as if it were a check: authority to pay, duty to pay, and no authority
or duty to pay. §87 of the Negotiable Instruments Law reconciled these the-
ories and made it the duty of the bank to pay the note. 2 PAToN's DIGEST
(1926) §§3719a, 3721a; MoRsE, op. cit. supra, §557. See Brooke v. Tradesman
Nat. Bank, 69 Hun 202, 204, 23 N. Y. Supp. 802 (1893). Under this view the
bank would doubtless be theoretically liable to the maker of a domiciled note
for non-payment as it would for dishonoring a check. Whether or not there
is actual liability would depend on the custom of the bank in paying the notes.
If it were accustomed to pay them as checks, refusal to pay would be equivalent
to business slander of the maker. If no such custom existed, as the above in-
quiry shows to be true of North Carolina, the community would not so interpret
the bank's refusal to pay.
'Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Seaman, 210 N. W. 937 (Iowa. 1926); Farmers'
Nat. Bank v. Venner, 192 Mass. 531, 78 N. E. 540 (1906) ; Piper v. Haywood,
71 Misc. Rep. 41, 127 N. Y. Supp. 240 (1911) ; DANIEL, op. cit. supra note 6,
§326a; NORTON, BILLS AND NoTEs (4th ed.) 1914 §69 and p. 194, note 1; BRaX-
NAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1926) §§71 and 87; 2 PAToN's DIGEST
(1926) §3744a.
" Binghampton Pharmacy v. First Nat. Bank, 131 Tenn. 711, 176 S. W. 1038,
2 A. L. R_ 1377 (1915) ; Aetna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank of N. Y., 46
N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep. 314 (1871) ; BRANNAN, Op. cit. supra note 7, §87; (1926)
29 HARe. L. REv. 204.
' Many courts unwarrantedly use §70 to defeat any attempt under §87 to put
the loss by bank failure on the holder of a domiciled note. If equity de-
mands that the loss fall on the maker, let the following states be guiding stars:
Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota (never adopted §87), North
Dakota (repealed it), and Georgia and Minnesota (expressly provided that a
note payable at a bank is not equivalent to an order on the bank to pay the
same for the account of the principal debtor thereon).
NOTES
The provision in the note that it will be paid at a bank is material,
as the parties have made it payable there for some reason.' 0 Dela-
ware and England hold this provision so material that compliance
with it must be alleged before suit can be brought on the note.1 '
Section 70 of the Negotiable Instruments Law recognizes the pro-
vision by providing that if the maker has sufficient funds on deposit
to meet the note when due he will be deemed to have made a tender,
thus saving costs of suit on the note and interest after maturity. As
a tender is beneficial to the maker he will most likely keep funds at
the bank to meet the note. However, to constitute a tender, the funds
must be kept there until the note is presented, 12 an indefinite length of
time. If the holder, in practical effect, causes the funds to be kept
in a weak bank until they are lost by bank failure he should assume
the loss.13 While it can not be said that the holder is under such a
duty to present as would subject him to a suit for failure to do so, he
may be said to be a party to the material agreement in the note that it
would be payable at a particular place. Section 70 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law puts the holder under a liability to lose costs of suit
and interest after maturity. Since he is not immune to losses for
failure to present he should assume all losses he had power to prevent.
H. B. PARKER.
TAX ADVANTAGES OF INCORPORATING NORTH CAROLINA ENTER-
PRISES OUTsrDE THE STATE'
Lack of uniformity of state laws has made selection of corporate
domiciles by promoters a favorite business method for tax economy.
" Bedford Bank v. Acoam, 125 Ind. 584, 25 N. E. 713, 21 Am. St. Rep.
258, 9 L. R. A. 560 (1890).
Shaw v. Newton, 5 Del. 19, 90 At. 465 (1914) ; Rowe v. Young, 2 Brod.
& Brig. 165, 129 Eng. Reprints 921 (1820) ; Spindler v. Grellette, S. C. 5 D.
& L. 191, 154 Eng. Reprints 163 (1847).
" Isbell v. Walton, Trust Co., 63 Okla. 182, 163 Pac. 716 (1917).
" Bank of Charleston Nat. Banking Ass'n. v. Zorn, 14 S. C. 444, 37 Am
Rep. 733 (1880) ; STORY, PROMISSORY NoTs (1850) §§227, 228; DANIEL, op. Cit.
supra, note 6; NORTON, op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 194. See Wallace v. McCon-
nell, 13 Peters 136, 149, 10 L. ed. 95 (1839) ; Eldred v. Hawes, 4 Conn. 465,
471 (1823) ; Reeve v. Pack, 6 Mich. 240, 241 (1859) ; Daughtery v. Western
Bank, 13 Ga. 287, 293 (1813) ; Fitler v. Beckley, 2 Watts & S. 458, 462 (Pa.
1841); Wilcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns 248, 8 Am. Dec. 396, 401, 404(N. Y. 1819) ; Armistead v. Armisteads, 10 Leigh 512, 525 (Va. 1893).
1 See charts infra pp. 193-195.
For comparison of taxes upon physical plant, see Macon, Interstate Compar-
ison of Tax Burden and Cotton Mills (limited to state and local taxes), N. C.
CLUB YEAR-BooK, 1927-28. See also, REPORT OF N. C. TAX CoMMissiox,
1928, ch. X, Taxation of Public Service Corporations, and ch. XI, Legal Re-
strictions on Taxation of Public Service Corporations, both applicable to gen-
eral business corporation taxation.
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A substantial part of the tax burden is determined by the law of the
state of incorporation, and obtaining a domicile in any given state
requires no more than the negligible price for the purchase of formal
legal existence and representation.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss, from a tax viewpoint,
the relative advantages of organizing a North Carolina enterprise
in certain "favored" states rather than in North Carolina. For illus-
tration, calculations are made for an hypothetical business corpor-
ation of $500,000 capital, the physical property and plant of which
is located within the state, (1) where all of its business will be trans-
acted within North Carolina, and (2) where only half of its business
will be within the state. The following discussion involves only
taxes paid by foreign and domestic corporations to North Carolina,
consideration of the taxes to be paid to otheF states to which the busi-
ness extends being unnecessary since these would be a constant item
regardless of the domicile selected. The accompanying tables2 indi-
cate in addition the taxes to the state of incorporation if other than
North Carolina. The states included in the charts are those generally
favored by corporations because of low tax rates, the liberality of
their corporation laws and the broad powers allowed.2 North Caro-
lina offers no special favors in these respects.
The North Carolina income tax of 4 1/2 per cent is applied to the
net earnings of a domestic corporation wherever derived,4 a credit
being allowed for the income tax paid to other states for business
transacted there. 5 Foreign corporations are taxed upon the propor-
tion of business attributable to North Carolina.0 A credit is also al-
lowed the foreign corporation for a proportionate part of the income
'Balance sheet for hypothetical corporation (infra chart note 2) based on
figures used in Comparative Tax Burden on Business Corporation, N. C. TAX
Com. REPoRT 1928, p. 748.
'Prentice-Hall Comparative Chart, 1929. North Carolina compares favor-
ably with these states in powers allowed, but requires somewhat more elaborate
annual reports from corporations: N. C. Laws 1929, c. 344, s. 603.
'N. C. Laws 1929, c. 345, s. 311, N. C. Code (Michie 1929 supplement)
§7889 (317).
'N. C. Laws 1929, c. 345, s. 323, par. 10, N. C. Code (Michie 1929 supple-
ment) §7880 (328) ss. 10. The states taxing corporate net earnings are: Ar-
kansas, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia,
Wisconsin.
' Supra note 4. For discussion of Corporate Income Taxation and Inter-
state Commerce, see N. C. TAx Cou. REaowr 1928, pp. 249-53; Newcomer,
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, NAT. TAx Ass. Bu., Oct. 1929; note
Ann. Cas. 1918A 426-38.
NOTES
tax payable to the state of incorporation, upon a reciprocal basis.7
The only income tax advantage in favor of foreign incorporation,
therefore, would be where the business will be divided between North
Carolina and jurisdictions which do not tax corporate earnings,
Upon the theory that the taxable situs of intangible personal prop-
.erty is the domicile of the owner, much of the intangible property of
a foreign corporation is not subject to local property taxes in North
Carolina.8 Organization of holding companies in states exempting
intangibles from property taxes has long been a favored method for
avoiding the burden on this class of property,9 the shares of the com-
pany being free from taxation as representing interests in property
already taxed.1 0  However, it seems that intangibles of the North
Carolina enterprise doing business entirely within the State could be
'N. C. LAws 1929, c. 345, s. 325, N. C. CODs (Michie 1929 supplement)
§7880 (331), credit allowed for such proportion of tax payable to domicile
state as the income from N. C. business is to entire net income, provided domi-
cile state allows similar credit to N. C. corporations, which reduces the rela-
tive disadvantage of incorporation in a state taxing incomes, but otherwise fa-
vorable.
"State may tax only property actually or constructively in its territory,
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 190 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36 (1905) ;
2 Coo=, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) §§447, 451. Mere presence of bank de-
posit insufficient to fix taxation situs, Tampa v. Florida, 89 Fla. 514, 105 So.
115 (1925) ; Coo=EY, op. cit. supra, §452. Tangible property taxed where lo-
cated, Delaware L. and W. Ry. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341, 25 Sup. Ct. 669
(1904). Intangibles at domicile of owner, Fidelity and Col. Trust Co. v.
Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40 (1917); Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100
U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558 (1879) ; United Verde Cooper Co. v. Feitner, 54 App.
Div. 217, 66 N. Y., Supp. 769 (1900) ; In re Pantlind Hotel Co., 232 Mich. 330,
205 N. W. 99 (1925) (Delaware corporation's stock of Michigan corporation
not taxable in Michigan) ; see Alston v. Warren Co., 197 N. C. 470, 471, 149
S. E. 680, 681 (1929); but see DeCaffey v. Leder, 250 U. S. 375, 39 Sup. Ct.
524 (1918) ; cf. Appeal of Callery, 278 Pa. 235, 16 AtI. 222 (1922). Unless
otherwise provided by statute, Cory v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297
(1904) (fixing situs of corporate shares at domicile of corporation), or unless
having acquired "business situs" in another state, infra note 11. See COOLEY,
op. cit. supra, §§462, 914; Notes (1926) 26 CoL L. RFv. 229; (1928) 27 MIc.
L. REv. 350; (1928) 42 HARV. L. Rv. 262; (1927) 6 N. C. L. Rv. 66.
"Intangible personal property includes open accounts and bills receivable.
credits whether or not evidenced by a writing, promissory notes, mortgages
(considered as personalty), bonds, shares of stock, deposits in banks, judg-
ments, and the like, where the debt or obligation is the real thing," COOLEY, op.
cit. supra §455.
The ease with which the tax on intangibles is avoided is strong argument
for change in the law. See Keister, The Taxing of Intangible Personal Prop-
erty, N. C. CLUB YsA-Boox, 1927-28; N. C. TAX Com. REPORT 1928, p. 321.
N. C. LAws 1929, c. 344, s. 306 (9), N. C. CODE (Michie 1929 supplement)
§7911 (111) ss. 9 original act held valid in Person v. Watts, 184 N. C. 499,
115 S. E. 336 (1922), discussed in NOTE (1922) 1 N. C. L. Rzv. 203. It is sug-
gested that little intangible property would be left to tax if all forms that
represented interests in property already taxed were exempt. See KxsT,
op. cit. supra note 9.
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taxed locally upon the theory that such property has acquired a "busi-
ness situs," independent of the owner's domicile, where the physical
plant is located and the business carried on.11 A limited inquiry dis-
closes that local tax assessors generally make no attempt to tax intan-
gibles of any foreign corporation, because of the practical difficulties
in reaching this form of property. 12
A third tax which tends to discourage North Carolina incorpora-
tion is the "corporate excess" tax, measured by the local property rate
upon the excess of the market value of the capital stock outstanding
over the assessed value of other taxable property of the corporation.13
Thus, theoretically, this tax, with the taxes on all other property of
The rule expressed in the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam yields to
the fact of actual control, and intangibles are taxed in state other than that of
owner's domicile on theory of business situs, and that the state controlling and
protecting the property should be allowed to tax it, Liverpool and L. and G.
Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Bd. of Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550, L. R A.
1915C 903 (credits originating from insurance business in state, taxed under
express terms of statute, the court pointing out that it was dealing not
merely with single credit or series of separate credits, but with a business) ;
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. City of New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27
Sup. Ct. 499 (1906); State Bd. of Assessors v. Comptoir Nat. d'Escompte,
191 U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct. 109 (1903); Redmond v. Rutherford, 87 N. C. 122
(1882) (note secured by land, owned by non-resident and in hands of agent in
business within the State, opinion by Ruffin, J.). Cf. Fidelity and Columbia
Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40, L. R. A. 1918C
124 (bank deposit in foreign state originating from business there, taxed
at domicile of owner). Double taxation involved in adoption by two
states of inconsistent principles, while economically undesirable, is not uncon-
stitutional, Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401 (1902). Cf. Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929).
The exception of local taxation rests upon localization of the business. The
cases have been restricted to situations where credits or securities have been
dealt with in active business in state other than owner's domicile, and where
taxing statute expressly included such credits of non-residents. It becomes
more uncertain, therefore, whether or not such property would fall within the
general terms, "property within the jurisdiction of the state," of North Caro-
lina statute. [N. C. LAws 1929, c. 344. s. 300; N. C. CODE (Michie 1929
supplement) §7971 (105)]. Such terms included deposit in bank to credit of
non-resident for inheritance tax, however. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189,
23 S. Ct. 277 (1902) ; Re Houdayer, 150 N. Y. 37, 34 L. R. A. 235, 55 A. S. R.
642, 44 N. E. 718 (1896). The cases holding credits taxable dealt with those
originating in business done by a branch of a foreign corporation, cases cited
supra. A priori, credits of enterprise incorporated in another state with physical
plant, etc., within the State are taxable where actual head offices are located.
For discussion of "business situs" of ciedits, see 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th
ed. 1924) §§465-468; Notes (1910) 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1120 (bank deposits);
(1908) 14 L. R. A. (N.S.) 493; (1906) 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 637.
' In the absence of specific statutory provision on the subject, the general
understanding of local assessors seems to be that such credits are not taxable.
An attempt to assess such property, if made, might be rendered futile by book-
keeping manipulations of corporations.
"N. C. LAWS 1929, c. 344, s. 603 (2) (6), N. C. Con (Michie 1929 supple-
ment) §7971 (154) ss 2, 6.
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the corporation, completes the local taxation of the entire value of the
corporation as a going concern.14 Foreign corporations are not taxed
upon any part of their corporate excess, 15 nor is their property within
the State assessed at its enhanced going-concern value,'8 in North
Carolina. The difference between the strict interpretation of the stat-
ute and the interpretation accepted in administration can very easily
change to a marked degree the total amount which would be paid by a
domestic concern as a corporate excess tax. The report of the State
Board of Assessment for 1928,17 shows a rather small percentage of
corporations having any taxable corporate excess, and only in ex-
ceptional cases is the excess more than negligible. just how far ad-
ministrative leniency will reduce the tax has not, and of course, cannot
b6 considered in a comparative study of State laws. The official pol-
icy cannot be predicted for a given year. The amount shown in the
chart is therefore computed upon the assumption that the corporate
excess tax is based upon assessment of stock at its full value.
The initial organization tax for North Carolina corporations has
been increased from twenty to forty cents per thousand dollars of
authorized capital stock.18 This is applied to no-par value shares at
"Upon principle, the true value of the property and franchise of the cor-
poration should be equalized to make it conform to the prevailing degree of
under-assessment practiced in respect of other kinds of property, Justice Bran-
deis, in Southern Ry. Co. v. Watts, .260 U. S. 519, 526, 43 Sup. Ct. 192, 195
(1923) ; see N. C. TAx Coli. REPORT 1928. p. 245. As to ordinary business cor-
porations, no data on the practice is obtainable. Equalization may be obtained
through the administrative policy discussed in text, see infra note 17.
The same principle should also be applied to both tangible and intangible
personal property. The study of the N. C. Tax Commission, in computing
taxes for. an hypothetical business corporation, used 65% of true value as
proper assessment for personal property, tangible and intangible, N. C. TAX
Com. REPORT 1928, p. 749, which policy is followed in the accompanying charts.
The equalization is destroyed in the present computation, however, by deducting
from the true value of corporate shares the assessed value of corporate prop-
erty.1 See State v. Williams-Echols Dry Goods Co., 176 Ark. 324, 3 S. W. (2d)
340 (1928), holding unconstitutional a statute applying the corporate excess
tax to foreign corporations.
"Held valid in Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 331, 43 Sup. Ct.
366 (1923) ; Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688, 15 Sup. Ct. 268 (1895).
See N. C. Tax Com. Report 1928, pp. 244-46 (evaluation methods). Must not
be pretext for extra-territorial taxation, Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 69,
40 Sup. Ct. 435 (1920).
11 REPORT OF STATE BOARD OF ASSESSMENT AND REVENUE, 1928, statements
27 and 28. Difficulty of evaluation and check-up on reports of corporations,
prevents correct determination of corporate excess for closed corporations,
stock of which is not on the market. Low corporate excess values may also
represent a recognition to some extent of the discrimination involved in a lit-
eral interpretation of the law.
" N. C. LAWS 1929, c. 36, N. C. CODn (Michie 1929 supplement) §1218.
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a fixed value of $100 a share.1 9 The admission tax for foreign cor-
porations remains at twenty cents per thousand of authorized capital
stock, with a maximum tax of $250.20
The annual franchise tax for domestic corporations is $1.00 per
$1,000 of issued capital stock, surplus, and undivided profits, 2 1 while
the yearly tax for the foreign corporation is measured by the same
rate upon the proportion of its stock value represented by its North
Carolina property and business. 22 The values given stock, surplus,
etc., must not be less than the values given the corporate property
within the State, plus the corporate excess.2 3
While the burden of the inheritance tax upon shares of North
Carolina corporations owned by non-residents is also a factor to be
considered, this tax has become relatively unimportant through the
adoption by the great majority of the states of reciprocal provisions
exempting non-resident owned shares from taxation. 24 An inherit-
ance tax on shares of stock in foreign corporations owned by a non-
resident is invalid even though the corporation may have property
within the taxing state.25 However, the State may and does levy a
transfer tax upon all shares of domestic corporations, 20 with the
exceptions under the reciprocity provision.2 7
"N. C. CODE (Mich'e 1927) §1167(e), annotator suggesting repugnancy to
equality clause of N. C. Constitution. For latest discussion of taxation of no-
par value stock, see Note (1929) 43 HAxv. L. REv. 104-9.
"N. C. CODE (Michie 1927) §1181.
N. C. LAWs 1929, c. 345, s. 210, N. C. CoDE (Michie 1929 supplement) §7880
(307).
' N. C. LAWS 1929, c. 345, s. 211, N. C. CODE (Michie 1929 supplement) §7880
(308). For constitutional restrictions upon special license or privilege taxes,
see N. C. TAx Com. REPORT 1928, pp. 253-64.
'Supra note 21.
' At time of Nat. Tax Ass'n meeting in 1928, the reciprocity arrangement
existed between twenty states: Connecticut, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New 'Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oregon and
Pennsylvania, provided for reciprocity; shares of non-residents were entirely
exempt in Colorado, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia; no inheritance tax existed in Alabama, Flor-
ida, Nevada, and District of Columbia. This list has grown considerably dur-
ing the past year, North Carolina among the states adopting reciprocity pro-
vision, infra note 27.
"Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 S. Ct.
256 (1925), over'g 187 N. C. 263, 121 S. E. 741 (1924); see (1926) 26 COL.
L. REv. 763, (1926) 39 HARV. L. Rxv. 898, (1926) 4 N. C. L. Rxv. 94.
" N. C. LAws 1929, c. 345, s. 20, N. C. CODe (Michie 1929 supplement)
§7880 (211), held constitutional in Cory v. Baltimore, supra note 8. Reports
required of executors, N. C. LAWs 1929, c. 345, s. 10, N. C. CODE (Michie 1929
supplement) §7880 (201). Payment of tax condition precedent to transfer of
shares on corporation books. N. C. CODE 1927, §7880 (200).
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Although the figures submitted in the accompanying charts are
of course not wholly accurate and are subject to adjustment for
specific cases (and while the advantage shown would be less or even
negligible for small companie), the investigation establishes the fol-
lowing general conclusions: The North Carolina enterprise doing its
entire business within the State may realize substantial economy
through foreign incorporation insofar as local taxation of intangibles
of foreign corporations is not attempted and as the corporate excess
tax is enforced against domestic corporations. In addition the tax
upon net earnings attributable to business without the State may be
avoided through foreign incorporation, where such foreign business
is within states not taxing corporate net incomes. Comparisons of
less substantial taxes appear from the tables. From a public point
of view, the possibility of complications upon insolvency, receivership,
and litigation, make it desirable that North Carolina tax laws be more
nearly equal to those of other states to the end that the company whose
practical business headoffices and plant are in the State be also domi-
ciled here.28
J. H. ANDERSON, JR.
"For discussion of situs of domestic corporations for taxation, see Note
(1928) 42 HARv. L. REv. 262, which suggests the possibility of reducing tax
on intangible personal property of domestic corporations by selecting as prin-
cipal piece of business within the state, a locality with low property tax rates.
